In fact, low-margin research is the area of biotechnology in which we have seen the most significant movement towards collective rights management. In the area of agricultural biotechnology research for developing countries, a 22-university consortium has been established to address impediments posed by upstream rights. Considerable efforts are also being made to achieve collective action in the areas of health-related biotechnology for developing countries. Moreover, although universities and other nonprofit institutions are probably the most likely candidates for successful collective action, there may be also some possibility of involving the private sector.
This essay proceeds in four parts. Part I gives a brief history of recent rights expansion and proliferation in upstream biotechnology. It argues that while large firms that conduct research in biopharmaceuticals or in agricultural biotechnology may be able to expend the considerable sums of money necessary to circumvent obstacles posed by proprietary rights, it would be irrational for researchers working on projects of uncertain or low commercial value to expend such resources. This Part also gives evidence of situations in which upstream complexity appears to have impeded research of uncertain or low commercial value. Part II discusses the likelihood of collective action, particularly public sector collective action, to reduce impediments to research of uncertain or low commercial value. It argues that collective action in the area of lowmargin research has significant prospects for success. Part III describes efforts by the public sector to secure collective rights management for humanitarian purposes in the area of agricultural biotechnology. It also examines the feasibility of similar efforts currently under way in the area of low-margin biomedical research. Part IV concludes by discussing the extent to which the private sector might need to be involved as well as other limitations of public sector collective action.
I. The Impact of Upstream Proprietary Rights

A. Increases in Upstream Proprietary Rights
In the area of biotechnology research, both biomedical and agricultural, the last two decades have been characterized by a significant increase in the number of upstream proprietary rights. 9 In the biomedical area, the increase in upstream numbers is perhaps best demonstrated through the patent statistics of research universities. 10 While U.S.
universities received only 264 patents annually in 1979, that number had increased to 3,764 by 2000: 11 about half of recent university patents appear to be in the biomedical arena. 12 The number of plant biotechnology patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has also increased substantially in the past two decades.
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Additionally, according to patent mapping done by Geoffrey Graff and his colleagues, these patents appear to cover virtually all of the basic technologies necessary to conduct research in agricultural biotechnology.
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The number of proprietary rights in biotechnology as a whole has also increased. The Biotechnology Industry Organization reports that the number of biotechnology patents issued grew from 2000 in 1985 to over 13,000 in 2000. www.bio.org/er/statistics.asp 10 Universities tend to conduct a significant amount of basic biomedical research. In contrast, according to one study, only 14% of private sector pharmaceutical R&D in the 1990s was devoted to basic research. TRENDS IN No. 5,843,780 (issued December 1, 1998) . To be sure, broad claiming on fundamental research is not entirely a new phenomenon. The Cohen-Boyer patent applications, which were filed in the late 1970s, broadly claimed one of the fundamental techniques of modern molecular biology -transforming a bacterial host with foreign DNA. The Cohen-Boyer patent was, however, licensed nonexclusively at a reasonable royalty. subsequent commercial products. If the recipient of the tool is a commercial entity, the research tool owner may seek a reach-through royalty. If the tool recipient is a university, the research tool owner may seek a reach-through license to any subsequent intellectual property. An NIH working group study conducted in the late 1990s concluded that material transfer agreements ("MTAs") for the transfer of tools often contained reach-through terms. (2004) (discussing "property-preempting initiatives" by pharmaceutical firms). One of these initiatives, the Single Nucleotide Polymorphism ("SNP") Consortium, an effort by pharmaceutical companies to put certain types of genomic information into the public domain, could be considered collective action of a sort. But efforts like the SNP Consortium, which aim to eliminate property rights, are quite different from property rights management. Downstream firms have also benefited from vigorous publicly funded efforts to undermine upstream rights. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note __, at 303-310 (discussing numerous activities undertaken by the National Institutes of Health in conjunction with academic scientists).
In contrast, in university contexts, where the immediately foreseeable payoffscommercial or academic -from research is often not high, researchers are unlikely to be willing or able to incur high transaction costs in order to gain access to upstream research. Such costs appear to have been mounting, as academic researchers increasingly receive research tools under restrictive MTAs. According to the 1999 report of an NIH working group on research tools, even MTAs that merely transfer tools from one academic researcher to another can contain reach-through claims; requirements of publication delay pending a determination of intellectual property rights; and prohibitions on transfer of the tools to other research institutions.
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In a recent survey conducted by Eric Campbell and his colleagues, 47% of academic geneticists who had, within the previous three years, made requests for additional data or materials relating to research published by other academics reported that they were ultimately unable to secure access to such data or materials.
27 This 47%
figure represents a substantial increase over the 34% figure reported in a prior survey conducted by the same authors in the mid 1990s. To some extent, these denials had to do with factors unrelated to proprietary rights, such as scientific competition. 28 However, the multivariate regression analysis performed by the authors of the survey indicated that denials were also independently associated with the need to honor the requirements of an industrial sponsor or the need to protect the commercial value of results. Moreover, the As a consequence of these withholding behaviors, 28% of the respondents to the Campbell survey reported that they were unable to confirm the published results and 21% abandoned a promising line of research. One might reasonably hypothesize that the research in question that did not go forward because of access denials had uncertain commercial or academic payoff, as least as compared to ongoing industry research.
With respect to patented materials to which they do not need physical access, there is evidence that academics reduce licensing and transaction costs by simply ignoring the patents. 32 Thus far, this "self-help" approach has enjoyed some success.
Patentees have tended not to sue academics for their infringing uses, either because they are not aware of such uses or because (as market optimists might predict) refraining from such suits constitutes an informal regime of price discrimination in favor of cash-strapped researchers. This situation may be unstable, however. As universities are increasingly seen, particularly by the courts, as ordinary commercial players from whom damages can 29
Id. at __.
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For some biomaterials, for example, the physical cost of transfer can be quite high. See, e.g., Share and Share Alike, 420 NATURE 602 (2002) (noting that the cost of duplicating the cDNAs described in scientist's paper was more than $10,000). constitutes both research and a commercial service provided to patients, the impasse in this area suggests that, in the future, price discrimination may not work as a mechanism for mediating the tension between the supra-competitive pricing allowed by proprietary rights and the limited budgets of most academic labs.
Similarly, in the context of research that is demonstrably of low commercial value, there is evidence that upstream proprietary rights have impeded downstream research. Consider the case of research into a malaria vaccine. The disease burden associated with malaria is very significant, on the order of over one million deaths a year.
The social value of a malaria vaccine would therefore be quite high. Nonetheless, because the primary market for such a vaccine would be in the developing world, such research is of low commercial value. Moreover, the Malaria Vaccine Institute ("MVI"), the major philanthropic organization that is supporting research into a malaria vaccine, argues that upstream patent rights are an important factor in chilling vaccine R&D. In the context of research of uncertain or low commercial value, then, there is substantial reason to be concerned about upstream proprietary rights. One question that might reasonably be asked in these contexts, however, is whether collective action to reduce at least transaction costs -and perhaps even actual licensing costs -is likely to be more successful in the context of uncertain or low margin research than it has been in the context of high-margin research. The next Part considers the conditions under which we are most likely to see collective rights management that reduces licensing and transaction costs.
II. The Prospect of Collective Action
As institutional economists have frequently noted, securing collective action can be very difficult, particularly if the collective action requires sacrificing short-term gain.
Success is most likely when the parties involved have shared values and interests; their numbers are relatively small; and they engage in repeated, readily observable interactions. 42 Given such preconditions, norms of behavior can develop and departures from these norms can be sanctioned through mechanisms such as shaming or exclusion.
Absent such preconditions, there is a tendency to defect and attempt to maximize one's individual gain at the expense of the collective. Moreover, where the collective action 40
Id. The presence of upstream patents has hindered not only low-value humanitarian R&D but also R&D in relatively low-value specialty crop areas, such as peanuts, broccoli, lettuce and tomatoes, in which the agribiotech industry does not have a strong commercial interest. Nonetheless, they agree to work on software projects for which they will secure neither monetary reimbursement nor the usual sort of exclusive proprietary rights. 44 More generally, the transaction-cost lowering effect of the Internet has allowed the emergence of a new production mode in which large numbers of relative strangers volunteer to work together on collective projects. 45 Because the informational inputs of large numbers of individuals can be readily evaluated and integrated, reward mechanisms such as prestige or reputation that previously worked only in smaller groups can be extended more
broadly. Such open source/commons-based production requires, however, not only low transaction costs but also low capital costs. In other words, volunteers must not be forced to invest resources other than time. In the area of "wet lab" biotechnology research, by contrast, large capital cost investments are still necessary. REV. 1293 REV. , 1345 REV. , 1353 REV. (1996 (noting this point in the context of both informal and formal patent pools).
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Depending on the type of open-source software development involved, the participants may either renounce intellectual property rights in their software contributions or they may retain such rights but license them freely subject to the condition that those who use, or improve, the software make it available on the same terms. For a collection of licenses approved by the Open Source Institute, see <www.opensource.org/licenses/index.php> (visited June 28, 2002 Barriers to collective action are likely to be particularly high when wet lab research has high commercial value. In this context, the players involved -small biotechnology companies, large agribusiness and pharmaceutical companies, not to mention universities and federal funding agencies -have asymmetric motivations and interests. While firms that make profits from end product patents might be able to reach agreement on licensing basic inventions widely on a low or no-royalty basis, firms (and universities for that matter) that focus exclusively on upstream research might believe in licensing more selectively at a higher royalty. 47 The bargaining difficulties created by asymmetric interests are only exacerbated when parties hold asymmetric rights -that is, if one party holds a broad foundational patent while other parties have narrower improvement patents. Compound these tactical asymmetries with informational deficits regarding valuation, and it is hardly surprising that we have not seen much movement towards collective rights management.
With respect to research of uncertain commercial value, the prospects for collective action should be higher. As an initial matter, for at least some of this research, also managed to convince their respective institutions to go along with their agreement (the so-called "Bermuda principles").
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It is important to emphasize, however, that the collective action in this case was instigated by a tightly knit group of influential scientists who adhered to communal views of science, backed by the institutional weight of the National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), and more or less foisted on the scientists' respective universities. Without these preconditions, collective action at the university level may be difficult to achieve. The available empirical evidence indicates that, unlike the scientists who worked on the Human Genome Project, university technology transfer are often evaluated on the basis of, and motivated in significant part by, the desire to increase licensing revenue.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, then, agreements to secure collective action that have not been led by scientists have been less than successful. Consider the case of the Uniform Biological Materials Transfer Agreement ("UBMTA"). In this voluntary agreement, reached in 1995 between university technology transfer officers from more than 100 institutions, the officers committed themselves to making unpatented biological materials freely available within the academic sector for research purposes. Compliance with this standard form MTA does not appear to have been uniform: as noted earlier, an NIH working group found that, at least in the late 1990s, many transfers of research tools between universities contained onerous restrictions.
In the case of transfer of research tools between universities, however, we are dealing in most cases with research of uncertain rather than demonstrably low value. By 48 Eliot Marshall, Genome Researchers Take the Pledge: Data Sharing, SCIENCE, April 26, 1996, at 477. definition, this uncertainty means that some of the materials may ultimately yield some profit. Failure to include proprietary restrictions in an MTA means the loss of these potential profits. As a consequence, university technology transfer offices ("TTOs") who are highly averse to losing revenue opportunities may be reluctant to approve free distribution. Risk-aversion may be particular high for university technology transfer officers who are less sophisticated, are under pressure to increase licensing revenues, and/or have unrealistic expectations of profitability.
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Because of the distinction between research of uncertain and low value, the less than complete success of the UBMTA does not necessarily bode ill for efforts at university collective action in the humanitarian context. While universities and technology transfer officers may be uncomfortable about foregoing an uncertain, but potentially large, revenue stream, they should be less concerned about relinquishing monetary gains from licensing directed towards developing country research. In the latter case, the value of the revenue stream foregone is unequivocally quite modest. The possibility of significant reputational benefit at modest financial cost should also make collective action enticing for universities and other non-profit institutions.
III.
Public Sector Efforts at Collective Action
Given this backdrop, it is not surprising that public sector institutions have Beachy's call. They have publicly committed themselves to articulating "best practices"
that include the possibility of systematically retaining rights so as to allow public sector researchers freedom to operate in the context of developing-world-oriented research.
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The collective institutional framework within which these best practices will be articulated is the newly established Public-Sector Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture ("PIPRA"). 53 PIPRA will also be responsible for studying the possibility of pooling complementary technologies held by the public sector and making these technology "packages" available at a low royalty for agricultural research applications in the public sector and in developing countries. 54 Finally, PIPRA will assist in developing under the best practices articulated by PIPRA. Even with respect to patents that have already been licensed exclusively, public sector ownership could conceivably confer some leverage. At a minimum, useful collective efforts could be made towards making transparent the licensing status of technologies owned by the public sector.
In the biomedical arena, the public sector presence is also quite significant. In the genomics area, for example, 42% of patents are owned by either universities, nonprofit research institutes, or the U.S. government. 59 Various efforts at public sector collective action for humanitarian purposes are also beginning to take shape. For example, the wanted to use the tools to do research on diseases that primarily afflict developing countries (and hence tend to be neglected by the commercial sector). Any entity that wanted to do so such research would simply notify the university of its intent. 62 The UAEM approach would also require licensees to grant back any improvement patents so that these patents would be available for open use in neglected disease research.
To be sure, efforts in health-related biotechnology as not as advanced as in the agricultural sector: neither MIHR nor UAEM has thus far enlisted the public support of significant numbers of universities. Indeed, some have suggested that licensees might not sign on to a grant back approach of the sort suggested by UAEM. 63 Nonetheless, more so than with high-commercial value research, or even research of uncertain commercial value, it should be possible to achieve some collective agreement. The success of one initiative in the AIDS vaccine arena, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative ("IAVI"),
suggests that some type of collective action might be possible. IAVI funds research and development on AIDS vaccine candidates for the developing world. Specifically, IAVI focuses on HIV-1 subtypes C and A, which are the major subtypes of HIV-1 prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, India, and China. In contrast, HIV-1 subtype B , on which most vaccine research to date has focused, is prevalent in North America and Europe.
Organizations that receive such funding (including, to date, Oxford University, the 62 UAEM Draft Developing Country License (on file with author). With respect to patents and related proprietary information on end product drugs, the UAEM draft indicates that university licensing should preserve open access for entities that want to manufacture the drug for use in developing countries.
Imperial College of Science and Technology, and the Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center) must agree, as a condition of such funding, to make any vaccine that is developed available at a "reasonable price" in the developing world. 64 Reasonable price includes actual costs of production, as well as a profit margin, but does not include R&D. To the extent that a given organization does not succeed in developing and manufacturing a vaccine, it must give IAVI royalty-free rights to practice any patent it has in the area of vaccine research. 65 That public sector organizations would agree to relinquish control over patent rights relevant to the developing world suggests that collective management of university rights in a manner helpful to the developing world is realistic.
V.
Limitations of Public Sector Collective Action
Reliance on voluntary collective action by public sector institutions to address the needs of developing countries has limitations. As an initial matter, public sector institutions own only a portion of the relevant intellectual property. Even in the area of agricultural biotechnology, which has long been dominated by public sector research, only about one-quarter of patents are held by the public sector. In addition, critical public sector patents -such as the technology for inserting new genes into plants -are effectively owned by the private sector in that they have been licensed exclusively to private firms with no reservation of rights. Hence the role of the private sector merits discussion.
A. The Role of the Private Sector
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The definition of reasonable price is based on a number of criteria, including the income level of the developing country. Developing countries are those that meet World Bank criteria for lower and middle income countries. IAVI currently has agreements with 6 Vaccine Development Partnerships and intends to be in Phase III trials on one candidate vaccine by 2004.
